ness left little room for meaningful judgement. Indeed, watching the drama of international politics and high culture unfold through the eyes of bureaucratic gumshoes is not unlike learning about Shakespeare by word-frequency counts. At times, Stephan himself gets bored with the details. In the case of the writer Anna Seghers, he suggests that the files actually have something new and interesting to say about her career. But for those interested in other dimensions of the exile phenomenon, Stephan refers curious readers to a sizeable literature on their doings.

The book has few insights on foreign policy, on exile politics, or on acculturation. But it is quite useful in making clear that the emergence of the national security state antedated the cold war.

St John's University FRANK NINKOVICH

HAL M. FRIEDMAN. *Creating an American Lake: United States Imperialism and Strategic Security in the Pacific Basin, 1945-1947*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001. Pp. xxix, 219. $69.95 (US).

MIGHT SOVIET PROPAGANDA during the cold war charging that the United States was an imperialist power have had some merit? Hal M. Friedman argues that at least in the Pacific the Soviets were much closer to the truth than US officials were willing to admit. With his first sentence, Friedman makes his thesis clear: 'Between 1945 and 1947, the United States embarked on an imperial course to guarantee its security in the postwar Pacific by taking direct control over several island groups conquered from Japan and wielding strategic influence throughout the Pacific Basin from these islands as well as from prewar American possessions' (p. xxv). This phenomenon is worthy of study for three reasons: first, the actions of the United States in this region were inconsistent with its foreign policy towards the rest of the world; second, it attempted to impose its will unilaterally without the alliances it sought in other regions; finally, the individuals attempting to initiate policy in this region used a broad definition of 'national security' that included economic and cultural factors.

The main mission of this new empire was to protect the United States. Military officials were most responsible for pushing the new agenda but, as Friedman notes, disputes on policy within the US government were always over the means rather than the ends. No one in official circles objected to domination of the region: Americans were ignorant of their own arrogance as they pushed aside their wartime allies in the region. The people favouring these views rejected the argument that domination of the region was imperial, because they were not seeking economic exploitation for its own sake. Friedman notes, however, that these US officials *were* attempting to establish economic and cultural domination of the region, and that such efforts were designed simply as additional ways to support the security mission. If other states had no influence, then there would be no challenge to the American position.

While Friedman has marshalled his evidence well, one wonders if he might have exaggerated the extent of US imperialism. The military tends to emphasize enemy capabilities rather than intentions, taking the most extreme scenario when making assessments of international affairs and asking for the moon and the stars even if unrealistic. There is no doubt that the US military wanted the country to exert strong and unilateral power in the region, but did the political leadership support its programme? The events of the early 1950s such as the Korean War, the Japanese peace treaty, and the Australia-New Zealand-United States security treaty would suggest that whatever support the administration of Harry S. Truman gave to these considerations, there were clear limits. To be fair, though, these events are beyond the scope of this study. Finally, while Friedman argues that the effort to project US influence into the Pacific was the last stage of westward expansion rather than the early stages of the cold war, his emphasis on security matters suggests exactly the opposite.

These comments aside, this is an impressive book. The research is extensive. The bibliography, fifteen pages long, is an important source for the specialist. Students and experts on the early cold war, the Pacific region, and strategic studies will profit from reading it. The book will not, however, receive the readership it deserves and merits: at $70.00, it is unlikely that anyone other than libraries will buy it. In that sense, the publisher has done Friedman a disservice.

Texas A & M University – Commerce NICHOLAS EVAN SARANTAKES

HANS BRANNER and MORTEN KELSTRUP, eds. *Denmark's Policy towards Europe after 1945: History, Theory, and Options.* Odense: Odense University Press, 2000; dist. Portland: ISBS. Pp. 441. $35.75 (US).

IN JUNE 1992, DENMARK rejected the Maastricht treaty and shocked its European Community partners. The rejection led to Danish exemptions from the planned further integration of the European Union. Subsequent Danish referenda on integration have since attracted worldwide attention: each time a new referendum comes to its final week, the country has been on the front page of the *New York Times*, which is unusual.

That Denmark should be front-page news around the world is surprising enough; what makes this case fascinating is that Denmark's suspicion of European integration seems to contradict the arguments usually made in its favour.

Conventional wisdom holds that integration magnifies the power of the weak and shrinks the power of the strong by insisting on rules, regulation, and standardization. Moreover, small states tend to be dependent upon free trade, a key element of Europe's integration plans. Denmark, in particular, has been dependent upon free trade for well over a century, having adopted it early in the nineteenth century and having built a remarkably successful agricultural sector primarily for export. Industrialization has only increased commercial integration with